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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONTRACT FOR SERvIcEs-LIMITATION TO QUAN-
TUM MERUIT.-MARTIN V. CAMP (i916) 56 N. Y. L. J. 24i.The plaintiffs'
assignors were retained by the defendant to conduct a case. Their
compensation was contingent on success and proportionate to the amount
recovered. They were discharged without cause after rendering substantial
services. The plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract. Held,
that the plaintiff could recover on a quantum meruit for services rendered,
but could not recover for breach of the contract.
Where the contract is broken without fault of the attorney, he may
recover on a quantum meruit for services rendered or he may sue on
the contract. Schemsohn v. Limonek (1911) 84 Oh. St. 425; Johnston
v. Cutchin (1903) 133 N. C. Iig; Henry v. Vance (igoi) III Ky. 72;
Henry v. Ross (1894) 5 Ind. 445; Lamed v. Dubuque (1892) 86 Ia. 166;
Moyer v. Cantieny (I889) 41 Minn. 242. New York makes an exception
and allows suit only on a quantum ineruit where the contract is for
services in a single suit. Andrewes v. Haas (1915) 214 N. Y. 255; Haire
v. Hughes (19o8) III N. Y. S. 892; Clark v. Nichols (19o8) in N. Y. S.
66; Johnson v. Ravitch (i9o6) 99 N. Y. S. iO59. Contra, Carlisle v.
Barnes (19o5) 92 N. Y. S. 917. But where an attorney is employed for
a fixed period under a general retainer even in New York he may have
an action for damages. Gilan av. Lamson Co. (I916) 234 Fed. 507;
Copp. v. Colonial Co. (i9Oi) 67 N. Y. S. 9io. The reason for this ex-
ception is not apparent. The reason given in the principal case should
apply to both, i. e., the personal nature of the relationship. There is not
sufficient difference between a contract for a fixed .period and the con-
tract in the principal case. Moreover the measure of damages may be
difficult but not impossible to establish. Henry v. Vance, supra.
S. J. T.
CARRIEus-LIAwLwTy PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF GOODs-EFFECT OF BILL OF
LADiNG.-KNAPP v. MiNNEP Aols, ST. P. & S. S. M. RY. Co. (i916) 159
N. W. (N. D.) 8r.-The plaintiff sued for the value of wheat lost while
in the custody, not of the defendant, but of the preceding carrier. The
defendant's station agent had issued a bill of lading purporting to have
received the grain at a station on the preceding carrier'E line before that
at which the loss occurred. Held, that the defendant was not bound by
the oral agreerment to assume responsibility for the grain while still in
the custody of the preceding carrier. Bruce, J., dissenting.
The duties and obligations of a common carrier with respect to goods
for transportation begin with delivery to it, and such delivery must be
complete. Iron Mt. Ry. v. Knight (1887) 122 U. S. 79; Ry. v. Comm er-
cial Union Ins. Co. (i89i) 139 U. S. 223; Garner v. St. Louis Ry. Co.
(i9o6) 79 Ark. 353; American Lead Pencil Co. v. Ry. (igio) 124 Tenn.
57. The issuance of a bill of lading or any written contract of shipment
is not essential to complete a delivery and, conversely, the mere issuance
['53]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of such does not itself transfer possession of the freight to the carrier.
The writing is only prima facie evidence of a receipt of the goods and
may be rebutted by oral evidence. Amory Mfg. Co. v. Gulf Ry. Co.
(1896) 89 Tex. 419; Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Wilson (1889) i1 Ind.
352. The local station agent of a railway company cannot, unless specially
authorized, bind it by contract to become liable for any loss or damage
to goods being transported over a preceding carrier's line. Roy v. C. &
0. Ry. Co. (r9o7) 61 W. Va. 616; Erie Ry. Co. v. Cappel (19o9) 8o Oh.
St. 128. A bill of lading being both a receipt and a contract for trans-
portation, its terms as a receipt might be rebutted by the oral evidence
offered by the defendant to show that its line did not begin at the station
named therein, but a subsequent one. But it was held to be the contract
aspect of the bill of lading that the plaintiff attempted to vary by oral
evidence that the defendant's station agent had bound it as carrier from
the named station on the preceding line, and the evidence was accordingly
rejected. Whitmack v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co. (igog) 82 Neb. 464. The
differentiation by the court of the two characters of a bill of lading is
exceedingly minute; particularly since it necessitates holding that the
same words naming the station of issuance are as an indicium of receipt,
variable, but when once so varied, become part of the written contract
against which oral evidence, seeking to prove that they mean what they
literally state, is inadmissible.
L. W. B.
CARRIERS-INDEMNITY-ISSUE OF CLEAN WARRANTS BY WAREHOUSE-
31AN.-GRovES AND SONS V. WEBB AND KENWARD (I916) 114 L. T. Io82.
The plaintiffs as warehousemen, at the defendant's request had issued
clean warrant for wheat of which only a small part had been transferred
into the plaintiff's warehouse from the defendant's ship. Owing to a
leaky barge some of the remaining wheat was injured in transitu and the
plaintiffs were compelled to pay £Io7 on the clean warrants to the ulti-
mate purchasers. They then sued for indemnity. Held, that there was
an implied contract by the defendants to indemnify the plaintiffs for such
loss.
The lightermen were agents of the defendants, but in order to bring the
defendants under an obligation to the plaintiffs for injury to goods still
within their possession, the court proceeded on the above theory. There
is a distinction between cases where one may act at his discretion and
where one must act according to directions. At first, recovery in the
former situation was denied. Haycraft v. Creasy (i8oi) 2 East, 92.
Later, it was decided that an auctioneer who sold at the request of the
defendant was entitled to indemnity for his liability to the true owner.
Adamson v. Jarvis (1817) 4 Bing. 66. See also Starkey v. Bank of
Enqland (I9O3) 88 I,. T. 244, and Sim v. Anglo-American Tel. Co. (1879)
42 L. T. 37. The obligation here put upon the defendants was quasi-
contractual; an implication in law rather than in fact. There was
enrichment to the defendants in being enabled to sell their wheat at full
market price. Indemnity can be claimed by a surety on payment of the
principal debtor's obligation, Appleton v. Bascom (1841) 3 Met. (Mass.)
i69; Stephen Sibley v. Hugh McAllister (1836) 8 N. H. 389; also by an
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agent for all acts performed in due execution of his authority. D'Arey
v. Lyll (1813) 5 Bin. (Pa.) 44i; Loveland v. Green (1875) 36 Wis.
612. Similarly, a servant who suffers damage through the negligence of
a superior officer may recover from the master. Little v. Miami R. R.
(I851) 20 Oh. 415. The rule indicated above has been extended in the
principal case to a novel situation.
G. S., JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION-POLICE POWER-BONUS TO
PURCHASING AGENT.-PEOPLE v. DAVIS (I916) I6o N. Y. S. 769.-The
plaintiff was convicted of paying a bonus to a purchasing agent contrary
to Sec. 439 of The Penal Law (Consol. Laws, c. 4o) which forbids a third
person to pay a commission or bonus to a purchasing agent even though
done with the knowledge of the principal. Held, that this statute was not
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable
restrictions as may be deemed essential to the safety, health, and good
order of the community. Crowley v. Christensen (I89o) 137 U. S. 89;
Thorpe v. Railroad Co. (1854) 27 Vt. 140. Such restrictions are within
the police power of the state. Commonwealth v. Alger (851) 7 Cush.
(Mass.) 53; Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park (878) 97 U. S. 57. The pro-
priety of the application of the police power, within its scope, is purely
a legislative and not a judicial question. Bertholf v. O'Reilly (1878) 74
N. Y. 509. Only where a statute is clearly an unjust discrimination in
favor of, or against, a particular class will a court declare it to be clash
legislation. Holden v. Hardy (1898) i69 U. S. 366. Special legislation
is not class legislation if the same rule is applied under similar circum-
stances to all engaged in the same business. Barbier v. Connolly (1885)
113 U. S. 703. A statute declaring it to be a felony for members of a
particular bank to embezzle funds is class legislation and unconstitutional.
Budd v. State (1842) 22 Tenn. 483. However, a statute making any per-
son engaged in the banking business criminally liable for receiving
money knowing the bank is insolvent, is not class legislation. Baker v.
State (1882) 54 Wis. 368. In the principal case, whether or not it is a
vicious tendency inviting fraud on the part of the agent, to allow an
agent to accept pay from both his principal and a third party, appears to
be a question for legislative decision and within a valid exercise of the
police power.
R. V. D.
DAMAGES-LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR PENALTY.-NoRTHWESTERN TERRA
CorA Co. v. CALDWEL ET AL. (i916) 234 FED. 49r.In a contract to furnish
the plaintiff, who was building a court house, $I3,ooo worth of terra cotta
which was to be manufactured especially for the purpose, it was stipulated
that, should the defendant fail to deliver at a certain date, he should pay
$50 "liquidated damages" for each day's delay. There was a delay of
twenty-nine days. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover on the con-
tract stipulation since it was a penalty and not liquidate damages. Hook,
J., dissenting.
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If the amount is disproportionate to the probable damage sustained, the
court will treat it as a penalty. Connelly v. Priest (1898) 72 Mo. App.
673; Zimmerman v. Conrad (1903) 74 S. W. (Mo.) I39. A contract for
the construction of a building costing $13,675, which called for a pay-
ment of $50 by the contractor for every day after the seventieth that the
building was uncompleted was held not an unreasonable amount as liqui-
dated damages. United Surety Co. v. Summers (igo9) 72 At. (Md.)
775. But Cochran v. People's Ry. Co. (1892) 113 Mo. 359, held that where
the contract price was $17,785, a forfeiture of $50 per day for sixty-five
days was a penalty.
J. I. S.
EViDENCE-RELEVANCY OF LEnTER-PREss copy OF A LETTER NOT PROVED
TO HAVE BEEN SENT.-FITcH v. SHUBERT THEATRIcAL COMPANY (I916) 56
N. Y. L. J. 2o.-In an action upon a contract for royalties, the plaintiff
alleged that the modification set up by the defendant, reducing the amount
to be paid, was obtained by fraud. The alleged fraud was the defendant's
misrepresentation that he was still paying 30 per cent of the gross proceeds
to the German authors. The defendant claimed to have written the plain-
tiff that he had purchased the rights of the German authors, and offered
in evidence a letter-press copy of the letter of notification. This evidence
was excluded by the trial court. Held, that it was not reversible error for
the lower court to exclude the copy, inasmuch as there was no proof of
the mailing of the original.
The court relied altogether upon the case of Gardam v. Batterson
(191o) 198 N. Y. 175. In that case the evidence offered was the dictation
and writing of the letter; the placing of it in a receptacle for that pur-
pose; and a copy of the letter but no proof that anyone mailed it. In
the principal case there were not only facts similar to those of Gardam v.
Batterson, supra, but also correspondence between the plaintiff and the
defendant, suggesting, by the failure of the plaintiff to renew a certain
demand, the possible receipt of the letter in question; and finally the
plaintiffs' refusal to deny that the letter was received. Had there been
any evidence offered by the person accustomed to mail the letters in the
receptacle, that he always mailed all the letters in it, the testimony should
have been admitted to prove an actual mailing. Hetherington v. Kemp
(1815) 4 Camp. N. P. 192; Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff (1826) 6 Cow.
(N. Y.) go. But regardless of whether the evidence offered in the prin-
cipal case should have been admitted for the purpose of proving a mailing,
it should have been admitted in order to show good faith on the part of the
defendant, since the want of good faith is essential to the existence of
fraud, which was the question before the jury. In order that the evidence
be admissible, it need only be logically and legally relevant. Intrinsic suf-
ficiency is not required. De Arman v. Taggart (1896) 65 Mo. App. 82. It
is sufficient if it may be expected to become relevant in connection with
other facts. Aycock v. Johnson (1898) ii Ala. 405. It is sufficient that
it is to be used merely to substantiate the party's own theory. Comstock
v'. Butterfield (1886) 6o Mich. 203.
F. L. McC.
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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF PROOF OF ANOTHER CRIME.-PEOPLE V. THAU
(1916) 219 N. Y. 39.-The defendant was indicted for assaulting the
complainant by striking him with a bottle. The prosecution was per-
mitted to introduce evidence of a previous act of vandalism by defendant,
in entering complainant's shop two weeks before the assault, and destroy-
ing $5o worth of garments by pouring ink upon them. Held, that such
evidence was admissible, the identity and motive of the assaulting party
being in issue.
The general rule may be thus stated: "It is improper in the trial of a
defendant for a crime to prove that he has committed other crimes having
no connection with the one under investigation." Jones, Evidence, Vol.
I, p. 721. But facts and circumstances which tend to prove any of the
essential elements or ingredients of the crime for which the defendant
is on trial, are not to be rejected as evidence simply because they may
prove, or tend to prove, the accused to have committed another and
distinct crime. Regina v. Briggs (1839) 2 Mood. & R. i99. Evidence of
another offense, if it tends to show the existence of a motive to commit
the crime charged, is competent where there is an apparent connection
between the imputed motive and such crime. Commonwealth v. Robin-
son (1888) 146 Mass. 57r. The same rule applies in proving intent.
State v. Burns (1886) 35 Kan. 387; in establishing identity, Johnson v.
Commonwealth (1886) 115 Pa. 369; or in proving malice, Walter v. People
(i865) 32 N. Y. 147. Where the crime charged is so connected with the
other offense sought to be proved as to form part of an entire transaction,
or where proving the former would tend to prove the latter, such evi-
dence is admissible. Wilson v. State (1900) 55 S. W. Tex., 68; State
v. Vines (z882) 34 La. Ann. 1979. The real test of admissibility is best
stated by Parker, C. J., dissenting, in People v. Molineux (igoi) i68
N. Y. 343, a case in which proof of another crime similar to that sought
to be proved against the defendant in the instant case, was rejected:
"Does the evidence of the other crime fairly aid in establishing the com-
mission by defendant of the crime for which he is being tried?" Accord-
ingly in the principal case the court modifies its position from that of
the majority in the Molineux case. For a discussion of the entire ques-
tion, see State v. Adams (1878) 20 Kan. 319.
A. N. H.
EVIDENCE-CoNFESSIONS IN CRIMINAL TRIAL-ADMISSIBILITY AGAINST
A CONFIDANT.-PEOPLE V. BucKMINSTER (i16) 113 N. E. (ILL.) 713.-
Two defendants, accused of arson, were tried jointly and, for the purpose
of impeaching one, his involuntary confession was offered. Held, that
it was error to admit that part of the confession which affected the
codefendant, even though the jury were instructed to disregard the con-
fession as affecting such codefendant.
In regard to the party who confessed, the trial court agreed with the
general rule that the involuntary confession qf one accused of crime is
inadmissible in evidence. Ammons v. State (I9o2) 8o Miss. 592. But it
accepted the confession to impeach the testimony of the person who made
it. This is a disputed point, and although before the upper court for
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the first time, is not passed upon. In some jurisdictions it is inadmis-
sible. People v. Yeaton (1888) 75 Cal. 415; Shephard v. State (1894) 88
Wis. 185. The main ground of this holding is that such a confession is
unreliable as circumstantial evidence of the untrustworthiness of the
witness. Harrold v. Oklahoma (igo9) 169 Fed. 47. In federal cases the
admission of such a confession is considered a violation of the con-
stitutional guaranty for the accused to be compelled to testify against
himself. Fifth Amendment, U. S. Const.; Sorenson v. U. S. (i9o6) 143
Fed. 82o. In other jurisdictions it is admissible. Hicks v. State (1892)
99 Ala. i69; State v. Broadbent (19o3) 27 Mont. 342. The theory is
that a defendant in a criminal case, by exercising the privilege given him
by statute of testifying, thereby becomes a general witness in the case,
subject to cross-examination and impeachment. Commonwealth v. Tolliver
(1875) i19 Mass. 312; Smith v. State (19o2) 137 Ala. 22.
The means by which the court avoids deciding the above question and
the ground on which it grants reversal is that in a joint trial only that
part of an involuntary confession is admissible which in no way impli-
cates the codefendant, even though the jury were instructed to disregard
the confession as affecting such codefendant. It is the general rule, in
a joint trial, that the voluntary confession of one defendant is admissible
against him, although it implicates the other defendants and tends to
prejudice them before the jury. Ackerson v. People (i888) 124 Ill. 563;
Fife v. Commonwealth (1857) 29 Pa. St. 429. The remedy in such case
is a motion for a direction by the court to the jury that the confession
be evidence only against him who made it. Commonwealth v. Inkgrahamn
(1856) 7 Gray (Mass.) 46; State v. Berry (1887) 24 Mo. App. 466.
But an involuntary confession, implicating codefendants, was held inad-
missible against codefendants in separate trials. Jackson v. State (19o6)
97 S. W. (Tex.) 312. The admissibility of an involuntary confession,
implicating codefendants, in a joint trial, is a new question, before the
court for the first time.
E. J. M.
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILiTY ACT-RIGHT TO SUE UNDER STATE
STATUTE.-NEW ORLEANS, M. & C. R. Co. v. JoNES Er AL. (1916) 72 So.
(Miss.) 68i.-A railroad porter, killed in interstate service, left surviving
him neither widow, children, parent, or dependent relative, who alone
have a right of action under Federal Employers' Liability Act, Apr. 22,
x9o8. Decedents half-brother brought suit under state statute. Held,
that the Federal Employers' Liability Act superseded all legislation over
the same subject by the states, and that no suit could be brought under
state law for injury or death of an employee of a common carrier, in-
jured or killed in interstate commerce.
For a discussion approving the above rule, see Taber v. Missouri Pac.
Ry. Co., 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 72; Staley v. IL. Cent. R. R. Co., 25 ibid.
497.
E.J. M.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-COMMUNITY PROPERTY-VoiDABLE GIFT By Hus-
BAND-RATIFIcATION.-SPRECxELS v. SPaEcxELs (y916) i58 PAc. (CAL.)
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537.-A husband gave away a large portion of the community property
to two of his children, with his wife's knowledge, but without her con-
sent as required by Civil Code, § 172, amended by Statute of 18gi, p.
425. The wife's will made after the death of her husband recited that she
intentionally omitted making provision for these two children because
her deceased husband had already given them a large portion of the
estate. Held, that the gift of community property by the husband was
voidable, not void, and was ratified and confirmed by the wife's will.
The law of community property is peculiar to those states which were
formerly part of the Spanish and French domain in America. All that
is acquired during coverture, otherwise than by gift, descent, or devise,
becomes the joint property of the two. Waterman Lumber & Supply
Co. (913) I59 S. W. (Tex.) 36o. In California prior to the Statute of
i8gi, supra, the husband could sell or otherwise dispose of the property;
the interest of the wife being considered a mere expectancy, Robinson v.
Magee (1858) 9 Cal. 81. However, a gift of the property was regarded as
beyond the power of the husband, and was voidable at the option of the
wife. Smith v. Smith (1859) 12 Cal. 216; Peck v. Bruminagin (1866)
31 Cal. 44o. The principal case turns upon the question whether the
Statute of 18gi, requiring the written consent of the wife to gifts of
community property by the husband, made such gifts absolutely void.
Under the Spanish and Mexican law, a donation of community property
by the husband to the wife or by the wife to the husband was valid if
not revoked; but was always revocable during the life of the donor.
Labbe's Heirs v. Abat (1831) 2 La. 553; Fuller v. Ferguson (1864) 26
Cal. 546. The principal case seems to have decided correctly that the
gifts by the husband to the two children wei e only voidable, and were
ratified by the subsequent will of the wife. It is, moreover, arguable,
that the limitation upon the power of the husband to give away the
community property is no greater in the prohibitive effect of the above
statute than the limitation upon his testamentary power. The husband
cannot by devise or will defeat the wife's right of one-half the community
property, although the wife may elect to take under her husband's will
instead of taking her statutory portion. The testamentary disposition
of the husband is consequently not void but voidable. Cunna v. Hughes
(1898) 68 Am. St. Rep. (Cal.) 27.
B. L.
MARRIAGE-FRAuD-ANNULMENT ON GROUND OF REFUSAL TO COHABIT.-
ANDERS v. ANDERS (i916) 113 N. E. (MASS.) 203.-The respondent mar-
ried solely in order to secure the right to bear the name of a married
woman, With the preconceived intention never to allow marital intercourse.
She left her husband, the libellant, at the church-door, and never saw him
again. Held, that the marriage would be annulled for fraud.
To secure annulment on the ground of fraud it must be shown that an
essential of the marital relation has been affected. Crane v. Crane (igoi)
49 Atl. (N. J. Eq.) 734; Boehs v. Hanger (19o) 59 At. (N. J. Eq.)
904; Smith v. Smith (i898) 68 Am. St. Rep. (Mass.) 44o. Formerly unless
there had been deception as to the person, no less degree of fraud would
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avail to set aside the contract of marriage. Swift v. Kelly (1835) 3 Kn.
257. This was extended to cases where there was physical incapacity,
and the impotence existed before the marriage. Annulment was decreed
after a required cohabitation of three years; or upon medical examina-
tion, G - v. G- (1871) L. R. 2 P. 287. Also upon the legal fiction
of inferred incapacity from the refusal of the respondent to cohabit.
S-v. A- (1878) 3 P. D. 72; B- v. B- [I90I] P. 39. The
wilful and persistent refusal to consummate the marriage contract was
per se and irrespective of any inferred incapacity, a sufficient ground
for a decree of annulment, even though the husband knew before mar-
riage of his wife's intention not to have intercourse. Dickinson v. Dick-
inson [1913] P. I98. In this country impotence has been held to be a
ground for annulment. Payne v. Payne (i89i) 49 N. W. (Minn.) 23o.
Likewise misrepresentation as to physical condition. Reynolds v. Rey-
nolds (1862) 3 Allen (Mass.) 6o5. Also fraudulent concealment of the
existence of disease. Smith v. Smith (I898) 171 Mass. 4o4. The prin-
cipal case following the authority of Dickinson v. Dickinson, supra, has
decreed annulment where no physical incapacity existed.
B. L.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-REFuSAL To
SUBMIT TO OPERATION AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-KRICINOVICH V.
AMERICAN CAR AND FOUNDRY CO. (I916) I59 N. W. (MICH.) 362.-The
plaintiff suffered a compound fracture of the leg while in the employ of the
defendant, and was twice operated on by physicians who pronounced this
particular injury cured. As he continued to complain of pain, another
operation to remove the entanglement of a nerve filament was recom-
mended, but he refused. Held, that where the operation was not dan-
gerous and offered a reasonable prospect of success, the plaintiff must
submit or relieve the company of its liability to compensate him for his
continued incapacity after such refusal.
No court will require submission to an operation where the possibility
of death is involved, even though all except forty-eight operations out of
twenty-three thousand may have been successful. McNally v. Hudson &
M. R. Co. (1915) 87 N. J. L. 455, affirmed (1916) 88 N. J. L. 729; Mattes
v. Phila. Traction Co. (1897) ig Pa. Co. Ct. io6. The law is not so
lenient with a complainant when there is no chance of death. In regard
to such cases there is decided conflict. Some courts have held that the
burden is on the employer, not only to prove the absolute safety of the
operation, but also that it would be successful. On these grounds a
plaintiff was justified in refusing to take ether, so as to permit the
manipulation of her arm to break down the adhesions around the shoulder
joint. O'Donnell v. R. I. Co. (1907) 28 R. I. 245. A seaman who refused
to permit a slight operation on his injured finger, later being compelled to
have it amputated, was permitted to recover because the defandants did
not prove that the proposed operation would have saved the finger,
although it was found as a question of fact that the plaintiff had been
unreasonable in refusing to submit to the operation. Marshall v. Orient
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Steam Navigation Co. [191o] i K B. 79. Where an operation is sure to
remove the incapacity, the workman must submit or release the company.
Varncken v. Moreland and Son [io9] I K. B. 185. Where in all
probability an operation would have restored capacity, a refusal was
unreasonable and prevented recovery. Walsh v. Lock & Co. [1914] 110
L. T. 452. The principal case goes one step farther and holds that where
there is a reasonable chance of success, the plaintiff's refusal to undergo
an operation bars any recovery after his refusal. But this advance of the
rule of reasonableness brings it into direct conflict with Marshall v. Orient
Steam Navigation Co., supra.
J. E. H.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CrMErARiEs-EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION.-
WOODMERE CEmETRY AssN. v. CITY OF DETROIT (1916) i59 N. W. (MIcH.)
383.-Comp. Laws, 84o6, declare. "All the lands of said corporation
enclosed and set apart for cemetery purposes, and all rights of burial
therein, shall be wholly exempt from taxation of any kind whatsoever."
Proceedings were instituted to condemn and sell the plaintiff's land
because of its refusal to pay the assessment for paving adjoining streets.
Held, that the plaintiff was not liable for the assessment. Brooke, Steere,
Bird, Kuhn, JJ., dissenting on the ground that the plaintiff was liable
to pay the tax out of other assets, though concurring that the plaintiff's
land could not be condemned.
Laws exempting cemeteries from taxation are very strictly construed.
Exemption from taxation does not exempt from special assessments for
local improvements unless specifically shown to be intended. Bloomington
Cemetery v. People (i8gi) I39 Ill. 16. If the additional word "assess-
ment" is used, this is generally construed to provide complete exemption.
Barry v. Wesleyan Cemetery Assn. (1881) IO Mo. App. 587; Oakland
Cemetery v. Yonkers (19o) 71 N. Y. S. 783. Some states have held that
"public taxes and assessments" included only general, indirect charges
and not specific direct benefits for one locality. Buffalo City Cemetery v.
Buffalo (1871) 46 N. Y. 5o6. A statute exempting from all taxation has
been held not to include relief from assessments. Mullins v. Mt. St.
Mary's Ccmetery Assn. (1912) 239 Mo. 681. Likewise, one exempting
"from any tax or imposition whatsoever." Baltimore v. Green Mt. Ceme-
tery (I855) 7 Md. 517. A contrary interpretation was given to a statute
exempting from "execution, taxation or any other claim, lien or process."
Union Dale Cemetery Company's Appeal (igio) 227 Pa. St. i. The
intention of the legislatures is to prevent destruction of the burial places
of the dead, not to assist the enterprises of corporations. Hence, when
there were any assets aside from the grounds, they have generally been
held liable for assessments. The majority base their opinion on the
ground that exemption from the lien means exemption from the tax.
The dissenting opinion, disagreeing on this point, and holding all the
assets of the corporation, except the burial grounds themselves, liable
for local improvements, seems to be more in accord with public policy




TAXATION-REFUND OF INVALID STAMP TAX.-VAN ANTWERP V. STATE
(i916) 113 N. E. (N. Y.) 497.-Under a statute empowering the comp-
troller to pay claims to persons who suffered loss by erroneously affixing
stamps to stock certificates, etc., in compliance with an unconstitutional
transfer tax, the plaintiffs, brokers, who in remitting to their customers
the proceeds of stock sales deducted the full amount of the transfer
stamps used therein, sued the state for the amount of the stamps. Held,
that the plaintiffs could recover since, being liable to suits by their cus-
tomers for the sums withheld, they had suffered loss. Seabury and Hogan,
JJ., dissenting.
The general authority of the broker to do everything necessary to effect
the sales did not cover the affixing of the stamps, for an unconstitutional
act is no authority or excuse for any action taken in conformance with
it. Norton v. Shelby County (1886) 118 U. S. 425, 442. The brokers'
act in buying was therefore their own act, the stamps their own property,
and they alone suffered loss by the cancellation and destruction. Any loss
to the customers came solely through the brokers' wrongful act in charg-
ing the amount of the stamps against their accounts. The state is in this
case an indemnifier. Though it is bound by the statute to pay only those
who have suffered a loss, the court seems to be applying a principle of
insurance law: a mortgagee's right to recover on a policy based on his
interest in the mortgaged property, is not affected by the repair of the
premises by the owner of the equity of redemption; he recovers, though
already indemnified. Foster v. Equitable Mut. Ins. Co. (1854) 68 Mass.
216. The insurer is not permitted to inquire into the state of accounts
between the plaintiff and the owner. Cone v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (1875)
6o N. Y. 61g. So here, whether or not the brokers have received moneys
from their customers does not concern the state. And not only by de-
stroying their own property did the brokers suffer loss, but by rendering
themselves liable to their customers for the sums wrongfully withheld.
Yet it is not quite clear how this liability can be considered a "loss" until
the customers are in possession of the complete facts; for it will never
come into existence, should they elect to ratify the brokers' act and sue
the state instead. The act of affixing the stamps was clearly done in the
course of transacting the customers' business, and it is competent for a
principal to ratify any act done by another as his agent. Hayward v.
Langmaid (19o2) I8I Mass 426. By such ratification the court concedes
that the customers would be subrogated to the brokers' rights. Knowledge
of a transaction is ordinarily necessary to ratification. Jones v. Atkin-
son (i88o) 68 Ala. 167. However, as the deduction of the stamp-price,
being uniternized, was only to be ascertained by computation, it was
possible to ratify in ignorance, taking the risks of the agent's action.
Fitzmaurice v. Baylay (1856) 6 El. and BI. 868. Also ratification of a
main transaction and all its incidents may take place when the principal
is only in possession of the facts of the main transaction. Dempsey v.
Chambers (i8gi) 154 Mass. 330. Why should not acceptitig a lump
remittance and thereafter treating the account of the transaction as closed
be such a ratification? The dissent argues that the retention of the price
of the stamps at the accounting constitutes a reimbursement of the
brokers. If they were thus indemnified, it seems that the customers
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might well, without ratification, by the very fact of payment, be subrogated
to the brokers' rights. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Erie Ry. Co. (187o) 73
N. Y. 399. To be thus subrogated it is not necessary that the inderinifier
be under a legal obligation to make the payment. St. Louis A. and T. Ry.
Co. v. Fire Assn. of Phila. (1895) 6o Ark. 325. All such considerations
the court meets by a disconcerting alternate ground for the decision:
even if the acts of the brokers be considered the acts of their customers,
the former may yet be treated so far as necessary as trustees of the
customers, and recover as such.
K. N. L.
UsuRY-LOAN OR SALE-DISTINCTION ON GROUND OF GOOD FAITH.-
PEOPLE V. SILVERBERG (igi6) I6o N. Y. S. 727.The complainant applied
to the defendant for a loan of $ioo. The defendant agreed to sell the
complainant a diamond ring which he could pawn and for which the
complainant agreed to pay $295, in monthly installments. The com-
plainant then pawned the ring for $125, the retail value of the same being
$ 8o. Held, that the real nature of this transaction was a loan and not
a sale and it was within Banking Law (Consol. Laws, c. 2) § 314 for-
bidding usury. Moss, J., dissenting.
The intent of the parties is the essential element. 39 Cyc. 929. If an
illegal interest was intended, whatever the color or disguise of the
transaction, it was a loan. Miller v. Bates (i86o) 35 Ala. 58o. But a
purchase of personal property of another with an agreement to resell it
to such other in the future has been held a valid sale. Rogers v. Blouen-
stein (19x5) I24 Ga. 5O1. Credit sales at exorbitant prices for imme-
diate resale by the vendee where the vendee is in great need of money
are generally regarded in the nature of loans and not bona fide sales.
Collier v. Barr (1879) 64 Ala. 543; Swanson v. White (1844) 5 Humph.
(Tenn.) 373; Quackenbos v. Sayer (1875) 62 N. Y. 344. The form
of the transaction in the principal case is similar to that in Rogers v.
Blouenstein, supra, and differs only in the finding of bad faith.
S. J. T.
